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Abstract. We consider a model of influence with a set of non-strategic agents and two strategic
agents. The non-strategic agents have initial opinions and are linked through a simply connected
network. They update their opinions as in the DeGroot model. The two strategic agents have fixed
opinions, 1 and 0 respectively, and are characterized by the magnitude of the impact they can
exert on non-strategic agents. Each strategic agent forms a link with one non-strategic agent in
order to alter the average opinion that eventually emerges in the network. This procedure defines
a zero-sum game whose players are the two strategic agents and whose strategy set is the set
of non-strategic agents. We focus on the existence and the characterization of equilibria in pure
strategy in this setting. Simple examples show that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium does
depend on the structure of the network. The characterization of equilibrium we obtain emphasizes
on the one hand the influenceability of target agents and on the other hand their centrality whose
natural measure in our context defines a new concept, related to betweenness centrality, that we
call intermediacy. We also show that in the case where the two strategic agents have the same
impact, symmetric equilibria emerge as natural solutions whereas in the case where the impacts
are uneven, the strategic players generally have differentiated equilibrium targets, the high-impact
agent focusing on centrality and the low-impact agent on influenceability.
JEL Classification: C71, D85
Keywords: influence network, beliefs, DeGroot model, strategic player, convergence,
consensus, equilibrium
1 Introduction
Opinion formation and influence are faithful companions of most dynamic interactions
between individuals. Since any interaction within a group of individuals can be repre-
sented by a network structure, it is not surprising that numerous models of influence in
social networks have been proposed in the literature. For surveys on belief and opinion
dynamics in social networks we refer, e.g., to Jackson (2008) and Acemoglu and Ozdaglar
(2011). These formal models can be used to understand how different assumptions about
the interactions affect the opinions that emerge and in particular to understand when in-
teracting individuals with different opinions or beliefs will ultimately reach a consensus.
However, one aspect of social learning and influence in networks that has not received
much attention is that of individual strategy. Often, the role of the interacting individuals
⋆ This research is supported by the European Project SIMPOL (Financial Systems Simulation and Policy Mod-
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is merely that of a passive vector for a diffusion process which causes them to adopt and
pass on informations and opinions they receive. In reality, it seems likely that (at least
some) individuals have their own convictions and agendas and will seek to impose these
in a social exchange. In the present paper, we present a model which, while remaining
close to the seminal framework of DeGroot (1974) addresses this issue.
Considering agents who are both strategic and susceptible to influence leads to obvious
difficulties in evaluating payoffs. Indeed, if an agent succeeds in imposing his initial opin-
ion but has since then changed opinions himself, it is not straightforward how he should
evaluate the outcome. For this reason, it seems natural to consider a model involving two
types of agents: strategic and non strategic ones. Strategic agents with conflicting opin-
ions attempt to optimally target non strategic agents to spread their own opinion. More
precisely, we consider a set of non-strategic agents characterized by a vector of opinions
(beliefs), where an opinion is a number in [0, 1]. These agents are permanently linked
through a strongly connected network and each agent updates his opinion by taking a
weighted average of the opinions of his neighbors, similarly to the model of DeGroot
(1974). Additionally, we assume that there are two ‘external’ agents (we call them strate-
gic agents), with the opposite opinions 1 and 0, and with some (possibly different) relative
weights. These strategic players target some of the non-strategic agents in order to alter
the average opinion that eventually emerges in the network. More precisely, each strategic
agent chooses exactly one non-strategic agent and forms a link with him to influence his
opinion, and consequently, the final vector of opinions, if convergence occurs. We prove
that convergence does occur.
By defining for each player a payoff based on his success in influencing the limit opin-
ion, we obtain a zero sum game whose players are the strategic agents and in which the set
of strategies is the choice of non-strategic agents. In a certain sense, the problem we con-
sider is similar to that of optimal targeting, in order to maximize the spread of something
in a network. However, the optimal targeting problem which has been extensively studied
in the literature, and which we discuss in detail in the next section, is an optimization
problem. When two players with conflicting interests choose targets, optimization based
on network structure is combined with strategic considerations. These two aspects are
reflected in our results.
First, we provide simple examples to show that the existence of a pure strategy equilib-
rium does depend on the structure of the network. For example, there is no equilibrium
in pure strategy in the circle because if the target of an agent is fixed, his opponent
can optimally undercut him by targeting the agent “next in line”. On the contrary, in
symmetric networks, every choice of a target is an equilibrium.
Second, we derive a general expression of the payoff of the strategic agent and a
characterization of equilibria in pure strategies. This characterization stresses two features
of target agents: their influenceability and their centrality (i.e the influence they exert).
Influenceability is measured via the number of outgoing links: the less opinions within the
network a non-strategic agent take into account, the more she can be influenced by the
strategic agents. As for centrality or influence, a new measure that we call intermediacy
naturally emerges in our framework: it counts the number of walks that go through
the agent. When the strategic agents exert an equal impact, we show that symmetric
equilibria naturally emerge and that the equilibrium target strikes the balance between
influenceability and influence that is appropriate given the size of the network and the
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weight of strategic agents. Influenceability gains importance vis-a`-vis influence as the size
of the network grows or the impact of the strategic agent decreases. In the case where
the impact of the two strategic agents are uneven, they generally have different targets
at equilibrium. Indeed, the influence of the low-impact agent would be washed away if he
targeted the same agent as his opponent. As a matter of fact, at equilibrium, the target
choice of the high-impact agent is driven by centrality and this of the low-impact agent
by influenceability.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of related literature on opinion formation. In Section 3 we recall the DeGroot model and
some results on nonnegative matrices that are then applied to the DeGroot model and to
our framework. The model of strategic formation of influence networks with two strategic
agents is formally introduced and its convergence is discussed in Section 4. The properties
of the Nash equilibrium of the model are studied in Section 5, which also discusses the
case of a single strategic agent. Section 6 concludes the paper with some final remarks.
2 Related literature on opinion and belief dynamics
As mentioned in Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011), one can classify models of opinion for-
mation according to the way information is conveyed (does an individual update his
opinion by observing other individuals or rather by communicating with them) and the
way it is processed (do individuals use Bayes rule or not in the updating process). In
the Bayesian literature, we find models of observation-based learning (e.g., herd behav-
ior of Banerjee (1992), informational cascades of Bikhchandani et al. (1992), see also
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993); Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004); Bala and Goyal (1998);
Acemoglu et al. (2011)) as well as models of communication-based learning (e.g., Ha-
genbach and Koessler (2010); Galeotti et al. (2013)). In the non-Bayesian literature, to
which the present paper belongs, a standard approach to opinion formation is imitation
where an agent uses a combination of beliefs of some others that he has observed (e.g.,
DeGroot (1974); DeMarzo et al. (2003); Golub and Jackson (2010)). Other non-Bayesian
approaches have their origin in models of interacting particle systems from statistical
mechanics. In these models, opinions can be represented by finitely many discrete values
(e.g. in the Ising model of Glauber (1963) and the voter model of Clifford and Sudbury
(1973)) or continuous values (e.g., Deffuant et al. (2000); DeGroot (1974); Krause (2000);
Hegselmann and Krause (2002)).
We are particularly interested in the seminal model of belief and consensus formation
by DeGroot (1974), where each agent updates his opinion (which is a number in [0, 1]) by a
weighted average of the opinions of the agents. The interaction among players is captured
by the social influence matrix. Convergence of opinions is obtained under mild conditions
on the interaction structure (strong connectedness and aperiodicity). Different extensions
of the DeGroot model have been proposed in the literature, in particular, models where
the updating can vary with time and circumstances, e.g., Krause (2000) (only weighting
those with similar beliefs), DeMarzo et al. (2003) (time-varying weight on own beliefs) and
models presented in Friedkin and Johnsen (1990, 1997). With regards to the aggregation
of opinions, Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) investigate a dynamic stochastic model
of influence where arbitrary aggregation functions (not only weighted averages) can be
used to update agents’ opinions, and Fo¨rster et al. (2013) investigate influence processes
3
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modeled by ordered weighted averaging operators which allow us to study anonymous
influence (aggregation depends only on how many agents hold an opinion instead of
which agents do so). Other studies on consensus and convergence of opinion dynamics
include that of Hegselmann and Krause (2002); Lorenz (2005, 2006); Golub and Jackson
(2010). More closely related to this paper, strategic extensions of the DeGroot model
are considered in Bu¨chel et al. (Forthcoming) where agents interact strategically in the
discussion and may misrepresent their opinion in a conforming or counter-conforming
way, and in Bu¨chel et al. (2014) agents strategically interact via expressed opinions, i.e.,
the transmission of cultural traits from one generation to the next.
Our paper adds two particular issues to this strand of literature. First, the existence
of different types of agents, with the particular case that some agents influence others
without themselves being influenced. Second, the targeting of specific (central) individuals
in social networks. In this respect, there exist several works in the literature in economics
and computer sciences to which our paper is related.
Acemoglu et al. (2010) consider a variation on the DeGroot model by assuming that
there are two types of agents: regular and forceful. While regular agents exchange infor-
mation with their neighbors when they meet, forceful agents influence others dispropor-
tionately. The authors use an asynchronous continuous-time model to represent meetings
between agents. Also Acemoglu et al. (2013) study an opinion dynamics model with two
types of agents: regular and stubborn. Regular agents update their beliefs according to
information that they receive from the neighbors and stubborn agents never update their
opinions. When the society contains stubborn agents with different opinions, a consensus
is never reached. Our approach is related to these works as we also consider two types
of agents but our key concern is the strategic nature of some of the agents, which is not
covered in the work of Acemoglu and co-authors.
The problem of targeting the right individuals is a major concern in marketing or in
lobbying and has been extensively studied theoretically in computer science. Which set
of individuals should we target if we aim to have a large cascade of adoptions of a new
product or innovation? Domingos and Richardson (2001) and Richardson and Domingos
(2002) pose a fundamental algorithmic problem for such social network processes. Also
Kempe et al. (2003) study this problem and consider the task of choosing influential
sets of individuals as a problem in discrete optimization. The authors focus on models
based on the use of node-specific thresholds (Granovetter (1978); Schelling (1978)), and
also consider dynamic cascade models for diffusion processes based on works in inter-
acting particle systems (Durrett (1988); Liggett (1985)). They show that approximation
algorithms for maximizing the spread of influence in these models can be developed in
a general framework based on submodular functions. Furthermore, the authors provide
computational experiments on large collaboration networks and show that the proposed
algorithm achieves significant performance gains over degree centrality and closeness cen-
trality. Similarly, Kempe et al. (2005) study the problem of target selection in order to
maximize the expected spread of an innovation or of some behavior within a social net-
work in the “word-of-mouth” referral framework. The authors develop a more general
model of influence propagation (decreasing cascade model) where starting with a set of
initially “active” nodes, a behavior spreads in a cascading fashion according to a proba-
bilistic rule. Which set of nodes should we target for initial activation to maximize the
expected size of the cascade?
4
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In the economics literature, we also find studies of optimal targeting in the context of
local interaction. Ballester et al. (2006) analyze a noncooperative game interpreted as a
network game with local payoff complementarities, where players decide how much effort
to exert. In such a game, the Nash equilibrium action of a player is proportional to his
Bonacich centrality (Bonacich (1987)). The authors study a policy for targeting the key
player, that is, a player whose removal from the network leads to the optimal change
in aggregate activity. They provide a characterization of the key player identified with
an “intercentrality measure” that takes into account both a player’s centrality and his
contribution to the centrality of the others.
Galeotti and Goyal (2009) model networks in terms of degree distributions and study
influence strategies in the presence of local interaction. In their model there are two groups
of players, and every member of the first group chooses a strategy to influence members
of the second group. The actions taken by the members of the first group lead to some
information that is shared locally by the members of the second group. A new distribution
of information is obtained and the members of the second group make decisions based
on this distribution, which generates payoffs for members in the first group. The authors
examine how social networks affect the optimal social influence decisions of players in the
first group.
The problem of identifying central agents in a social network is also studied in Banerjee
et al. (2014). They analyze a “gossip” process, where players generate some information
about particular people which is then stochastically passed from neighbor to neighbor.
The authors use a specific measure of a player’s ability to send information called “dif-
fusion centrality” (Banerjee et al. (2013)) which measures how widely the information
spreads from a given player in a given number of time periods and for a given random
per period transmission probability. The diffusion centrality nests degree centrality (if
there is one time period of communication), eigenvector centrality and Katz-Bonacich
centrality (if there are unlimited periods of communication).
3 Nonnegative matrices and the DeGroot model
3.1 General results on nonnegative matrices
We recall general results on nonnegative matrices given in Seneta (2006). By convention,
transposition is denoted by ′, and hence row vectors are marked with ′, like v′.
We set N = {1, . . . , n} and consider nonnegative n × n matrices. The kth power
of such a matrix T = [tij] is denoted by T
k = [t
(k)
ij ]. To any nonnegative matrix T we
associate a directed graph Γ with set of nodes N , and an arc (i, j) exists iff tij > 0. A
walk of length k from node i to node j is a sequence of nodes i = i0, i1, . . . , ik = j such
that (iℓ−1, iℓ) is an arc in Γ for ℓ = 1, . . . , k. Note that the existence of such a walk is
equivalent to t
(k)
ij > 0. We define cycles as walks from a node to itself. We write i→ j if
there is a walk from i to j. We also use the notation i 6→ j and i↔ j.
A class or strongly connected component of Γ is a set of nodes C such that either C is
a singleton or i↔ j for every distinct i, j ∈ C, and any C ′ ⊃ C does not fulfill the latter
property. A class can be essential if no arc is going out of it, otherwise it is inessential.
5
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The canonical form of a matrix T with q essential classes and w inessential classes is
T =


T1 0 · · · 0
0 T2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 Tq
R Q

 (1)
with
Q =


Q1 0 · · · 0
Q2
...
...
. . .
S · · · Qw

 (2)
where elements in N have been ordered so that essential classes come first (in any order),
then inessential classes, so that if for i, j in two distinct inessential classes, i is ranked
before j, we have i 6→ j. We have
T k =


T k1 0 · · · 0
0 T k2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 T kq
Rk Qk

 (3)
with
Qk =


Qk1 0 · · · 0
Qk2
...
...
. . .
Sk · · · Q
k
w


where Sk, Rk are in general difficult to compute.
The period d(i) of an element i ∈ N such that i → i is the greatest common divisor
of those k for which t
(k)
ii > 0 (i.e., k = length of a cycle on i). If i ↔ j then d(i) = d(j),
so that one can speak of the period of a class. A class is aperiodic if d(i) = 1 for some i
in the class.
A matrix T is primitive if T k > 0 for some integer k. It is irreducible if for every
i, j ∈ N there exists an integer m(i, j) such that t
(m(i,j))
ij > 0. An irreducible matrix
corresponds to a single class. T is primitive iff T is irreducible and aperiodic.
In the rest of the section we recall some important facts.
Fact 1 The Perron-Frobenius theorem holds for irreducible matrices T : there exists a
positive real eigenvalue r, which can be associated with unique (up to a multiplicative
constant) positive left and right eigenvectors, and such that r ≥ |λ| for every other eigen-
value λ. The eigenvalue r is a simple root of the characteristic equation of T . Moreover,
if the period of the class is d, there are exactly d eigenvalues λ such that |λ| = r. These
eigenvalues are λk = r · e
2πik
d , k = 1, . . . , d. Finally, a useful result is that
min
i
n∑
j=1
tij ≤ r ≤ max
i
n∑
j=1
tij (4)
6
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(idem for columns), with equality on one side implying equality throughout.
Let us then consider a row-stochastic matrix P . If P is irreducible, then by (4), 1 is the
Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue, and there is a unique left eigenvector v′ (i.e., v′T = v′) such
that v′ · 1 = 1. With notation of (1), we have the following:
Fact 2 If P is primitive, then limk→∞ P
k = 1 · v′.
Fact 3 limk→∞Q
k = 0
Fact 4 Interpreting pij as the probability to go from state i to state j, we have
xρ = [I −Q]
−1x(1)ρ
where xρ ∈ [0, 1]
n, xρ,i is the probability to finish in class ρ, starting from the inessential
state i, and x
(1)
ρ,i =
∑
j∈Eρ
pij is the probability of absorption in class ρ after one step,
starting from i.
The matrix [I −Q] is the fundamental matrix of absorbing chains. We recall:
Lemma 1 Let A be a finite n×n matrix such that limk→∞A
k = 0. Then [I−A]−1 exists
and
[I − A]−1 =
∞∑
k=0
Ak
with A0 = I.
3.2 The DeGroot model
We recall the seminal model of opinion formation and influence introduced in DeGroot
(1974). Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents interacting in a social network. Each
agent i has an initial opinion (belief) on a subject denoted by xi(0) ∈ [0, 1] and updates
his opinion at discrete time instances. The interactions between the agents are represented
by a nonnegative n × n row-stochastic matrix W = [wij], where wij denotes the weight
(or trust) that agent i places on the current opinion of agent j in forming his own opinion
in the next period. The opinions are updated according to
x(t) = Wx(t− 1) = W tx(0) (5)
where x(t) = [x1(t), . . . , xn(t)]
′ is the opinion vector at time step t. Hence, agents update
their opinions by a convex combination of their current opinions and the opinions of their
neighbors. We associate to the matrix W a directed graph Γ such that there is an arc
from i to j iff wij > 0.
We can apply the results recalled in Subsection 3.1 to the DeGroot model. The matrix
W given in (5) can be put under the form (1) and (2), after identification of the essentials
and inessential classes. We write x = [xE xI ]
′ = [xE1 · · · xEq xI1 · · · xIw ]
′ the
partition of the vector into the essential and inessential classes.
Consider an essential class, represented by submatrix Ti. By (3) it follows that
xEi(t) = T
t
i xEi(0) (i = 1, . . . , q)
7
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and for each primitive (i.e., aperiodic) Ti, one obtains from Fact 2 the steady-state vector,
with vi the left eigenvector of Ti such that v
′i · 1 = 1,
xEi = 1v
′ix(0) (6)
i.e., each agent in Ei converges to consensus v
′ix(0). On the other hand, for inessential
agents, the steady-state vector must satisfy
xI = RxE +QxI (7)
i.e., xI = (I − Q)
−1RxE if I − Q is invertible. By Fact 3, Lemma 1 proves that I − Q
is always invertible, so that a steady-state vector x always exists, obtained from (6) and
(7).
4 Convergence in the model of influence with two strategic
agents
We consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of non-strategic agents. Each agent is characterized by
an initial opinion (belief) represented by a number in [0, 1].
The non-strategic agents are linked through an influence network represented by a
directed graph with adjacency matrix A. An arc from i to j, i.e., aij = 1, means that i
listens to the opinion of j.
Each agent updates his belief as in the model of DeGroot (1974), i.e., according to
a linear combination of his neighbors’ beliefs. A simplifying assumption1 is to consider
that each neighbor is equally weighted:
wij =
1
di
aij
where di =
∑n
j=1 aij is the out-degree (number of outgoing links) of agent i. We call it
the uniform (weighting) model. Under this assumption, the weight matrix W is simply
W = DA, where D is the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements 1/d1, . . . , 1/dn.
The evolution of the opinion vector x(t) obeys (5), and as explained in Section 3.2,
convergence to a consensus occurs in each essential aperiodic class (see (6)), and a steady-
state vector exists for agents in inessential classes (see (7)). We give two examples for
illustration.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the network given in Figure 1.
Taking the uniform model, the corresponding matrices are:
A =

1 1 01 1 1
1 0 1

 , D =

1/2 0 00 1/3 0
0 0 1/2

 , W = DA =

1/2 1/2 01/3 1/3 1/3
1/2 0 1/2

 .
We see that N is the (only) essential class, which is aperiodic, hence W is primitive.
Therefore, a consensus x is reached in N , given by x = [4
9
1
3
2
9
]x(0). ♦
8
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321
Fig. 1. Example 1: Consensus in N
3
21
Fig. 2. Example 2: Consensus in N
Example 2 Let the network of the non-strategic agents in N be given in Figure 2.
The corresponding matrices are:
A =

1 0 01 1 1
1 1 1

 , D =

1 0 00 1/3 0
0 0 1/3

 , W = DA =

 1 0 01/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3

 .
We see that {1} is the only essential class, while {2, 3} is inessential. Therefore, W is
not irreducible. From (6), we immediately have x1 = x1(0), and from (7) we obtain that
x2 = x3 = x1. Hence, also in this case a consensus is reached in N . ♦
We then consider two strategic agents a1 and a2, who have the fixed beliefs 1 and 0,
respectively, and each of them forms exactly one link with a non-strategic agent in order
to influence the dynamics of the beliefs. More precisely, each strategic agent ai chooses a
strategy si in N that represents the non-strategic agent he decides to form a link with.
We assume throughout the paper that the weights given to agents a1, a2 by the agents in
N are positive. Our aim is to study the dynamics of beliefs in this modified network.
As before, letW be the n×nmatrix of weights for the agents inN , before perturbation
by a1, a2, and let P be the (n+2)× (n+2) matrix of weights of the agents in N and a1,
a2. Then, the essential classes of P are {a1}, {a2}, and all previous classes of W become
inessential, say I1, . . . , Iw. The structure of P , which is still row-stochastic, is therefore
P =

 1 0 00 1 0
R Q


where Q has form (2) and R 6= 0.
1 This assumption is used to simplify the exposition. Our results can easily be extended to arbitrarily weighted
networks.
9
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We may think of specific models for obtaining the weights in P from those in W . In
particular, we may consider the uniform model introduced above, where wij =
aij
di
, and
that the strategic agents a1, a2 have an impact of λ and µ respectively (λ, µ > 0) when
computing the out-degrees. Specifically, if s1 = s2 = i, weight wij becomes
1
di+λ+µ
, while
weights on a1, a2 are respectively
λ
di+λ+µ
and µ
di+λ+µ
, and if s1 6= s2, we get
ws1j =
aij
ds1 + λ
, j ∈ N,
ws1a1 =
λ
ds1 + λ
, ws1a2 =
µ
ds1 + λ
,
and similarly for s2. Then, one gets
P =

 1 0 00 1 0
∆λ,µ(s)Eλ,µ(s) ∆λ,µ(s)A

 (8)
with Eλ,µ(s) = [λes1 µes2 ], where ei is the unit vector with coordinate 1 at i, and ∆λ,µ(s)
is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
1
d1 + λδ1,s1 + µδ1,s2
, . . . ,
1
dn + λδn,s1 + µδn,s2
,
where δ denotes the Kronecker symbol, i.e., δi,sj = 1 if i = sj and 0 otherwise.
In general, the evolution law of the opinion vector x(t) is given by
x(t+ 1) = Px(t). (9)
By writing the opinion vector x as x = [xa1 xa2 xN ]
′, we immediately see that xa1(t), xa2(t)
are constant and equal to 1, 0 respectively and that the evolution law for the opinions of
the non-strategic agents is given by:
xN(t+ 1) = R
[
1
0
]
+QxN(t). (10)
The convergence of opinions in our model with strategic influence is then a direct
consequence of the results recalled in Section 3.2. Namely we have:
Proposition 1 For any initial vector of opinions x := [xa1 xa2 xN(0)]
′ with xa1(0) = 1,
xa2(0) = 0 and xN(0) ∈ [0, 1]
n, we have:
lim
t→+∞
P t[xa1 xa2 xN(0)]
′ = [xa1 xa2 xN ]
′
where xa1 = 1, xa2 = 0 and xN = (I −Q)
−1R[1 0]′.
In particular, if the two strategic agents choose the same target, one obtains conver-
gence towards a consensus.
Proposition 2 Let P be the (n+ 2)× (n+ 2) matrix of weights obtained if a1, a2 target
the same agent i, and only this one. Then agents in N reach a consensus α, given by
α = α1
α1+α2
, where α1, α2 are the weights put on agents a1, a2 by agent i.
10
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Proof: Suppose that a1, a2 target i. Then
R =


0 0
...
...
α1 α2
...
...
0 0


with 0 < α1 + α2 ≤ 1. Since the solution of xN = R[1 0]
′ +QxN is unique, let us check
if a consensus vector xN = [α · · · α]
′ is a solution. We have for all rows j 6= i:
α = 0 + 1 · α = α,
since P is row-stochastic, and for row i, we obtain:
α = α1 + (1− α1 − α2)α,
which yields α = α1
α1+α2
. 
5 Nash equilibrium in the model with two strategic agents
5.1 Convergence and consensus reaching
In the remaining of the paper we place ourselves in the “uniform” model where the
dynamics of opinions are given by equation (8). In this setting, Proposition 1 implies
convergence of the beliefs towards the steady-state vector xN ∈ [0, 1]
n such that
xN = (I −∆λ,µ(s)A)
−1λ∆λ,µ(s)es1 . (11)
Note that this steady state vector is independent of the initial beliefs of the non-strategic
agents, but of course depends on the strategy vector s.
Moreover, according to Proposition 2, in the case where both strategic agents choose
the same target, one obtains convergence towards a consensus equal to α = λ
λ+µ
. In
particular, if the weights are equal, the consensus is 1/2.
Example 3 Let us illustrate these results for the network of non-strategic agents pre-
sented in Figure 2. We set λ = µ = 1 and consider the following cases:
Case 1: s1 = s2 = 1. Then
[R Q] =

1/3 1/3 1/3 0 00 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3


The solution of xN = R[1 0]
′ +QxN is x1 = x2 = x3 = 1/2.
11
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Case 2: s1 = s2 = 2. Then
[R Q] =

 0 0 1 0 01/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3


The solution is x1 = x1(0), and x2 =
3
7
x1(0), x3 =
5
7
x1(0).
Case 3: s1 = 1, s2 = 2. Then
[R Q] =

1/2 0 1/2 0 00 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3


The solution of xN = R[1 0]
′ +QxN is x1 = 1, x2 = 3/5, x3 = 4/5.
Case 4: s1 = 2, s2 = 1. Then
[R Q] =

 0 1/2 1/2 0 01/4 0 1/4 1/4 1/4
0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3


The solution of xN = R[1 0]
′ +QxN is x1 = 0, x2 = 2/5, x3 = 1/5. ♦
5.2 Payoffs and best responses of the strategic agents
We now turn to the core of our analysis and consider the zero-sum game Gλ,µ with
players a1, a2 whose respective impacts are λ, µ > 0 and whose sets of strategies are
s = (s1, s2) ∈ N ×N. We assume that the payoff of each strategic agent depends on the
average asymptotic belief. That is, the payoff πλ,µ(s) of player a1 is given by
πλ,µ(s) = 1
′ · (I −∆λ,µ(s)A)
−1λ∆λ,µ(s)es1 (12)
and player a2’s payoff is equal to n− πλ,µ(s). We know from Section 5.1 that I −∆(s)A
is indeed invertible and that the payoff can also be written as
πλ,µ(s) = 1
′ ·
∞∑
m=0
(∆λ,µ(s)A)
mλ∆λ,µ(s)es1 (13)
Example 4 In Example 3, we have the following:
- for s1 = s2 = 1, x¯ =
[
1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
]
, the payoff of each strategic agent is 3/2;
- for s1 = 1, s2 = 2, x¯ =
[
1, 3
5
, 4
5
]
, the payoff of agent a1 is 12/5 and the payoff of agent
a2 is 3/5;
- for s1 = 2, s2 = 1, x¯ =
[
0, 2
5
, 1
5
]
, the payoffs of agents a1 and a2 are 3/5 and 12/5,
respectively.
♦
12
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The game Gλ,µ being a zero-sum game with finite strategy space, it definitely has
at least an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Yet mixed strategies have little relevance
as prescriptions for link formation. We thus proceed with the characterization of the
conditions under which the game admits equilibria in pure strategies. We place ourselves
in the following in the case where the network between non-strategic agents is simply
connected and therefore the matrix W is irreducible.
We shall derive a more explicit expression of the payoff function. Let us then denote
by Pmk,l the set of walks of length m from k to l. For any walk p = (i1, · · · , im) we denote
by w(p) its “weight” measured according to W = DA, i.e.,
w(p) :=
m−1∏
j=1
wij ,ij+1
We also denote by νk(p) the number of times the walk p passes through k (without
taking into account the departure node). Equation (13) can then be rewritten as a sum
representing the influence conveyed through each walk of the networks and where each
passage through one of the target node is re-weighted in order to account for the influence
of the external agents. That is, one has:
- if s1 = s2 then
πλ,µ(s) =

∑
k∈N
∞∑
m=0
∑
p∈Pm
k,s1
w(p)
( ds1
ds1 + λ+ µ
)νs1 (p) λ
ds1 + λ+ µ
(14)
- if s1 6= s2 then
πλ,µ(s) =

∑
k∈N
∞∑
m=0
∑
p∈Pm
k,s1
w(p)
( ds1
ds1 + λ
)νs1 (p)( ds2
ds2 + µ
)νs2 (p) λ
ds1 + λ
(15)
It is already clear from this expression that the payoff of a link to agent i depends on
the influenceability of the agent (measured by the number of outgoing links of the agent)
and the influence of the agent measured by the (weighted and discounted) number of
walks that pass through that agent. This formula also allows to further characterize the
payoff in some particular cases of interest.
Remark 1 If all the non-strategic agents have the same out-degree d, the payoff is given
by:
πλ,µ(s) =

∑
k∈N
+∞∑
m=0
∑
p∈Pm
k,s1
(
1
d
)m(
d
d+ λ+ µ
)νs1 (p) λ
d+ λ+ µ
if s1 = s2 (16)
πλ,µ(s) =

∑
k∈N
+∞∑
m=0
∑
p∈Pm
k,s1
(
1
d
)m
dνs1 (p)+νs2 (p)
(d+ λ)νs1(p)(d+ µ)νs2 (p)

 λ
d+ λ
if s1 6= s2 (17)
13
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In particular, for d = 1, we have:
πλ,µ(s) =
∑
k∈N
+∞∑
m=0
∑
p∈Pm
k,s1
λ
(1 + λ+ µ)νs1 (p)+1
if s1 = s2 (18)
πλ,µ(s) =
∑
k∈N
+∞∑
m=0
∑
p∈Pm
k,s1
λ
(1 + λ)νs1 (p)+1 (1 + µ)νs2 (p)
if s1 6= s2 (19)
If we additionally assume that the network is a circle, then a walk p of length m from k
to s1 passes m÷n times
2 through any node plus once in every node between k and s1. Let
σ(s2, s1) denote the length of the shortest walk between s2 and s1 (setting σ(s1, s1) = 0).
Then one has:
- if s1 = s2 then
πλ,µ(s) = n
+∞∑
h=0
λ
(1 + λ+ µ)h+1
=
nλ
λ+ µ
(20)
- if s1 6= s2 then
πλ,µ(s) =
+∞∑
h=0
[
σ(s2, s1)λ
(1 + λ)h+1 (1 + µ)h
+
(n− σ(s2, s1))λ
(1 + λ)h+1 (1 + µ)h+1
]
=
λ(n+ µσ(s2, s1))
λ+ µ+ λµ
(21)
Hence, if we focus on the best-response of player a2, playing s2 such that σ(s2, s1) = 1 is
better for player a2 than playing any other strategy different from s1. In other words, the
best strategy for agent a2 is to target the non-strategic agent immediately before s1 on the
circle. The payoff is then equal to πλ,µ(s) =
λ(n+µ)
λ+µ+λµ
. Also note that (20) coincides with
the result given by Proposition 2.
In order to compute the payoff function for an arbitrary network, we introduce the
following auxiliary concepts. We denote by Γi the set of cycles around i (i.e., walks that
start and finish in i) that do not pass through i in between and let γi =
∑
p∈Γi
w(p).
We denote by Φi the set of walks to i that have never passed through i before and let
φi :=
∑
p∈Φi
w(p).
First, we consider symmetric strategies. Assume that both players play i and let Πki
denote the set of walks that end in i and have gone exactly k times through i before.
Then one has:
πλ,µ(i, i) =

+∞∑
k=0
∑
p∈Πki
w(p)
(
di
di + λ+ µ
)k λ
di + λ+ µ
(22)
A walk in Πki consists in k cycles around i plus, possibly, a walk to i. Hence,∑
p∈Πki
w(p) = (γi)
k(1 + φi) (23)
2 We denote by m÷ n the quotient of the Euclidian division of m by n.
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and inserting (23) into (22) leads to
πλ,µ(i, i) =
(
+∞∑
k=0
(
γi
di
di + λ+ µ
)k
(1 + φi)
)
λ
di + λ+ µ
=
λ(1 + φi)
di + λ+ µ− γidi
Hence, the payoff under symmetric strategies is
πλ,µ(i, i) =
λ(1 + φi)
di + λ+ µ− γidi
(24)
We have the following:
Lemma 2 If W is irreducible, then for all i = 1, . . . , n, γi = 1 and φi = n − 1. Conse-
quently, πλ,µ(i, i) =
nλ
λ+µ
.
Proof: Take i ∈ N and compute γi, i.e., the sum of all weights of cycles starting at i,
without passing through i twice. We remark that the weight of a walk from i to j is the
probability of going from i to j (i, j being seen as states) using exactly the sequence of
states in the walk. Hence, γi is the probability to start from i and to return to i by some
walk. Since W is irreducible, this probability is equal to 1.
Similarly, consider φi, i.e., the sum of all weights of walks that arrive to i without
passing through i before. Any such walk must start from some node j 6= i. Again, sinceW
is irreducible, the probability to start from j and arriving at i is equal to 1, and therefore
φi = n− 1. Inserting γi = 1 and φi = n− 1 in (24) yields πλ,µ(i, i) =
nλ
λ+µ
. 
Note that the value of πλ,µ(i, i) stated in Lemma 2 was already obtained in Proposition
2.
Next, we consider the case where player a1 plays i and player a2 plays j, i.e., we
assume that s1 = i and s2 = j. We denote by C
j
i the set of cycles around i that do not
pass through j and by Bji the set of walks to i that do not pass through j. Let Fi,j denote
the set of direct walks from i to j, i.e., the set of walks that start in i, end up in j and
do not pass through i nor j in between. We also let
cji :=
∑
p∈C
j
i
w(p), bji :=
∑
p∈B
j
i
w(p), fi,j :=
∑
p∈Fi,j
w(p)
The corresponding set of walks and measures for j are denoted by Cij, B
i
j, Fj,i, c
i
j, b
i
j, and
fj,i. We have the following:
Lemma 3 If W is irreducible, then for all i, j ∈ N and i 6= j, bji + b
i
j = n− 2.
Proof: We proceed as in Lemma 2, interpreting weights of walks as probabilities. Let i, j
be fixed and consider walks from a node k 6= i, j to i. As W is irreducible, the probability
of going from k to i is equal to 1. Observe that a walk from k to i either passes through j
or not, and that in the former case, a walk from k to i is decomposed into a walk from k
to j without passing through i and a walk from j to i. Thus we obtain, after factorization:
1 =
∑
p∈B
j
i
p starts from k
w(p) +
∑
p∈Bij
p starts from k
w(p)
∑
p′∈Fj,i
w(p′)
15
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Observe that
∑
p′∈Fj,i
w(p′) = 1. It follows that, summing over all k 6= i, j:
n− 2 =
∑
k 6=i,j
∑
p∈B
j
i
p starts from k
w(p) +
∑
k 6=i,j
∑
p∈Bij
p starts from k
w(p)
= bji + b
i
j.

Let us denote by φji the sum of weights of the walks to i but where each passage
through j is weighted by the factor
dj
dj + µ
. Similarly, let us denote by γji the sum of
weights of walks that cycle around i but where each passage through j is weighted by the
factor
dj
dj + µ
. We have:
φji = b
j
i + fj,i
dj
dj + µ
(
+∞∑
k=0
(
cij
dj
dj + µ
)k)
(1 + bij) = b
j
i + fj,i
dj
dj + µ− cijdj
(1 + bij) (25)
because the set of walks to i consists in walks to i that do not pass through j plus the
set of direct walks from j to i preceded by an arbitrary number of cycles around j (not
passing through i) preceded by a walk to j that do not pass through i.
In a similar fashion
γji = c
j
i + fj,i
dj
dj + µ
(
+∞∑
k=0
(
cij
dj
dj + µ
)k)
fi,j = c
j
i + fi,jfj,i
dj
dj + µ− cijdj
(26)
because the set of cycles around i consists in the set of cycles around i not passing through
j together with the set of direct walks from j to i preceded by an arbitrary number of
cycles around j (not passing through i) preceded by a direct walk from i to j.
An argument similar to the one in the symmetric case yields:
πλ,µ(i, j) =
λ(1 + φji )
di + λ− γ
j
i di
(27)
Using equations (25) and (26) we get:
πλ,µ(i, j) =
λ
(
1 + bji + fj,i
dj
dj + µ− cijdj
(1 + bij)
)
di + λ−
(
cji + fi,jfj,i
dj
dj + µ− cijdj
)
di
=
λ
[
(1 + bji )µ+ dj(1− c
i
j)
(
1 + bji + fj,i
1+bij
1−cij
)]
(di + λ)(dj + µ− cijdj)− di
(
cjiµ+ djc
j
i (1− c
i
j) + djfi,jfj,i
)
One can then remark (when γi and φi are defined as in the symmetric case, i.e., without
further weighting when passing through j) that
φi = b
j
i + fj,i
(
+∞∑
k=0
(cij)
k
)
(1 + bij) = b
j
i + fj,i
1
1− cij
(1 + bij) (28)
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γi = c
j
i + fj,i
(
+∞∑
k=0
(cij)
k
)
fi,j = c
j
i + fi,jfj,i
1
1− cij
(29)
Hence, we have:
πλ,µ(i, j) =
λ
[
µ(1 + bji ) + dj(1− c
i
j)(1 + φi)
]
(di + λ)(dj + µ− cijdj)− di(c
j
iµ+ dj(1− c
i
j)γi)
(30)
Using similar arguments as in Lemma 2, we then get:
Lemma 4 If s1 = i and s2 = j 6= i, one has:
πλ,µ(i, j) =
λ
[
µ(1 + bji ) + dj(1− c
i
j)n
]
µdi(1− c
j
i ) + λdj(1− c
i
j) + λµ
(31)
Note that one necessarily has cji < 1, because the network is simply connected and
hence at least one cycle around i passes through j. Similarly, one has cij < 1, b
j
i < n− 1
and bij < n− 1.
5.3 Characterizing equilibria - equal influence
We first place ourselves in a setting where both strategic agents exert the same impact,
i.e., λ = µ. In this setting, the structure of the game is perfectly symmetric and so shall
be the payoff functions (as a matter of fact if λ = µ, we slightly abuse the notation
and write πλ instead of πλ,λ). This fact is not clear from equation (13) but it is a direct
consequence of Lemmas 2 to 4. Indeed, one then has:
Proposition 3 If λ = µ, then one has for all i, j ∈ N :
πλ(i, j) + πλ(j, i) = n (32)
Proof: From equation (31) and Lemma 2, we have:
πλ(i, j) =
λ(1 + bji ) + dj(1− c
i
j)n
di(1− c
j
i ) + dj(1− c
i
j) + λ
, πλ(i, i) =
n
2
(33)
and from Lemma 3, we get:
πλ(i, j) + πλ(j, i) = n (34)

Hence, the game is symmetric and standard results about symmetric zero-sum games
(see Duersch et al. (2012)) imply the following characterization of equilibria in pure
strategies (we write Gλ instead of Gλ,λ):
Theorem 1 (i) A pair of strategies (i, i) is an equilibrium of the game Gλ if for all j ∈ N :
λ
[
2(1 + bji )− n
]
≥ n
[
di(1− c
j
i )− dj(1− c
i
j)
]
(35)
17
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(ii) If a pair of strategies (i, j) is an equilibrium of the game Gλ, then also (i, i) and (j, j)
are equilibria.
Proof: Given the game is symmetric, (i, i) is an equilibrium if and only if player a2 has
no profitable deviation, that is for all j ∈ N, πλ(i, j) ≥ πλ(i, i). Part (i) of the theorem
then follows from equation (33). Part (ii) is a direct consequence of the fact that the
game is symmetric. 
A first consequence of Theorem 1 is that we are able to show that there indeed exist
influence networks that admit equilibria in pure strategies as underlined in the following
remark.
Remark 2 Let us consider a perfectly symmetric network, i.e., a network such that for
all i, j ∈ N , di = dj, c
j
i = c
i
j, b
j
i = b
i
j, and fi,j = fj,i. Then condition (35) always holds so
that every (i, i) is an equilibrium of the game Gλ in this network.
Hence, combining Remarks 1 and 2, it appears that the network structure indeed has
implications for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Conclusion 1 There are networks for which there exist equilibria in pure strategies (e.g.,
perfectly symmetric networks) as well as networks for which there exists no equilibrium
in pure strategies (e.g., the circle).
A second consequence of Theorem 1 is that symmetric equilibria shall be the focal
points of our analysis. In order to proceed with the characterization of these symmetric
equilibria, we first consider the two polar cases where the impact of the strategic agents
is either infinitely large or infinitely small with respect to the normalized influence within
the network. In this respect, one has:
Proposition 4
(i) One has limλ→0 πλ(i, j) =
dj(1− c
i
j)n
di(1− c
j
i ) + dj(1− c
i
j)
, so that (i, i) is an equilibrium of the
game Gλ as λ→ 0 if and only if for all j ∈ N :
dj(1− c
i
j) ≥ di(1− c
j
i ) (36)
(ii) One has limλ→+∞ πλ(i, j) = 1 + b
j
i , so that (i, i) is an equilibrium of the game Gλ as
λ→ +∞ if and only if for all j ∈ N :
bji ≥ b
i
j. (37)
As mentioned above, one necessarily has 0 < cji < 1 for a simply connected network,
so that condition (i) in Proposition 4 can equivalently be written as:
1
dj(1− cij)
≤
1
di(1− c
j
i )
. (38)
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The quantity
1
di(1− c
j
i )
is a measure of influenceability of agent i corrected by the external
influence exerted on the network. Indeed, it corresponds to the default influenceability,
1
di
, amplified by a factor
1
1− cji
, that accounts for the self-feedback that i exerts on itself
through the network (i.e., the cycles around i) without interference from j (i.e., the cycles
not containing j). Hence, if cji = 0, that is, if all the cycles around i pass through j, then i
has only a default influenceability of
1
di
. On the contrary, as cji tends towards one, that is,
as i is shielded away from the influence of j, then the influenceability of i tends towards
infinity as agent i will eventually be exposed only to the external influence he receives.
We can then interpret the first part of Proposition 4 as follows: (i, i) is an equilibrium for
a vanishingly small level of influence only if i is relatively more influenceable than any
other agent j ∈ N .
To clarify the interpretation of the other polar case where the level of influence tends
towards infinity, it is useful to introduce the quantity b
j
i to denote the sum of weights of
the walks to i passing through j. Then by virtue of Lemma 2 one has that bji + b
j
i = n−1,
so that π(i, j) = n− b
j
i and condition (ii) of Proposition 4 is equivalent to
b
i
j ≥ b
j
i . (39)
This quantity b
i
j can naturally be interpreted as a measure of the influence of j on i.
Hence, one can interpret the second part of Proposition 4 as follows: in the case where
λ→ +∞, (i, i) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all j, the relative influence of j on
i is greater than the relative influence of i on j as measured by b
i
j and b
j
i , respectively.
Furthermore, as πλ(i, j) + πλ(j, i) = n, and hence b
j
i + b
i
j = n, equation (39) is also
equivalent to b
i
j ≥
n
2
. Therefore it seems natural to introduce as an absolute measure of
influence in our context the quantity Bi = minj 6=i b
i
j representing the minimal number of
walks to a given node going through i. In this sense Bi measures the “intermediacy” of
agent i. It is then clear that (i, i) is an equilibrium if and only if Bi ≥
n
2
.
We now consider the case of an arbitrary λ > 0. According to equation (35), (i, i) is
an equilibrium if and only if:
λ
[
2(1 + bji )− n
]
≥ n
[
di(1− c
j
i )− dj(1− c
i
j)
]
Using the fact that bji = n− 1− b
j
i , this is equivalent to:
λ
[
n− 2b
j
i
]
≥ n
[
di(1− c
j
i )− dj(1− c
i
j)
]
(40)
As moreover n = b
j
i + b
i
j, this yields:
b
i
j − b
j
i ≥
n
λ
[
di(1− c
j
i )− dj(1− c
i
j)
]
(41)
Hence, in the general case, the equilibrium condition depends both on the influence and
the influenceability of the target i. Namely (i, i) is an equilibrium if for all j ∈ N , the
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excess influence/intermediacy of j over i is greater than the excess influenceability of j
over i, scaled by the factor
n
λ
. As we have seen above, the relative importance of influence
vis-a`-vis influenceability increases with the level of external influence λ. Conversely, as the
size of the network increases, the relative importance of influence vis-a`-vis influenceability
decreases. In other words, as the size of the network grows, highly influenceable agents
become optimal targets.
5.4 Characterizing equilibria - unequal influence
We now turn back to the general case where λ 6= µ and assume, without loss of generality,
that λ > µ. As the game is no longer symmetric, (i, i) no longer is a natural candidate
for equilibrium in pure strategies. As a matter of fact, using equation (31), one has
πλ,µ(i, j) ≥ πλ,µ(i, i) for some j 6= i, only if
(λ+ µ)[µ(1 + bji ) + ndj(1− c
i
j)] ≥ n[µdi(1− c
j
i ) + λdj(1− c
i
j) + λµ] (42)
Using Lemma 3, i.e., the fact that (1 + bji ) + (1 + b
i
j) = n, this simplifies to:
µ(1 + bji )− λ(1 + b
i
j) ≥ n[di(1− c
j
i )− dj(1− c
i
j)] (43)
Using the fact that 1 + bji = n− b
j
i and b
j
i + b
i
j = n, this eventually yields
(µ+ λ)b
i
j − λn ≥ n[di(1− c
j
i )− dj(1− c
i
j)] (44)
Similarly, one obtains that πλ,µ(i, i) ≥ πλ,µ(j, i) for some j 6= i, only if
(µ+ λ)b
i
j − µn ≥ n[di(1− c
j
i )− dj(1− c
i
j)] (45)
Hence, as λ > µ, a necessary and sufficient condition for (i, i) to be an equilibrium
is that equation (44) holds true for all j 6= i. Now, it is clear that unless b
i
j = n, that
is unless all the walks to j go through i, one has b
i
j < n and hence the left hand side of
equation (44) tends towards −∞ as λ tends towards +∞. This implies that for λ large
enough (and a given µ), equation (44) cannot hold and hence (i, i) cannot be a Nash
equilibrium. Namely, one has:
Proposition 5 For fixed µ > 0 and large enough λ, there exists no i ∈ N such that (i, i)
is an equilibrium in pure strategy of Gλ,µ.
The interpretation of this result is relatively straightforward: if one of the strategic
agents has a much larger level of influence than the other one, then the low influence
agent should not choose the same target as the high influence agent because his influence
would get washed away.
Let us then consider a pair of strategies (i, j) ∈ N × N. It is an equilibrium if and
only if for all k ∈ N , πλ,µ(i, j) = maxk∈N πλ,µ(k, j) and πλ,µ(i, j) = mink∈N πλ,µ(i, k). As
in the equal strategic influence case, we investigate the polar case where λ tends towards
+∞ (while µ remains fixed) and we have:
lim
λ→+∞
πλ,µ(i, j) := π∞,µ(i, j) =
µ(1 + bji ) + ndj(1− c
i
j)
dj(1− cij) + µ
= 1 +
µbji + (n− 1)dj(1− c
i
j)
µ+ dj(1− cij)
(46)
So that:
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Proposition 6 A pair of strategies (i, j) is an equilibrium of the game Gλ,µ as λ→ +∞
if and only if for all k ∈ N :
1 +
µbji + (n− 1)dj(1− c
i
j)
µ+ dj(1− cij)
≤ 1 +
µbki + (n− 1)dk(1− c
i
k)
µ+ dk(1− cik)
(47)
and
1 +
µbji + (n− 1)dj(1− c
i
j)
µ+ dj(1− cij)
≥ 1 +
µbjk + (n− 1)dj(1− c
k
j )
µ+ dj(1− ckj )
(48)
Again, an interesting particular case is this where µ tends towards +∞ (while remain-
ing negligible with respect to λ) and one then has:
π∞,µ(i, j)→ (1 + b
j
i ). (49)
Hence, (i, j) is an equilibrium if, given j, bjk reaches its maximum in i and, given i,
bki reaches its minimum in j. In other words, we have a “location game” on the network
where the low influence agent must pick up a target that stays clear from the walks
leading to its opponent’s target while the high influence agent must pick up a target that
is the end point of the largest number of walks going through its opponent’s target.
For an arbitrary µ, the optimal target takes into account the location and the influ-
enceability of the target of the low influence agent. The lower µ is, the more important
the influenceability of the target is. In a nutshell, if the influence potential is very un-
equal, the low influence agent shall focus on the margins of the network where highly
influenceable agents lay, while the high influence agent shall focus on central nodes of the
network, which themselves have a lot of influence.
5.5 External influenceability and opinion variance
The measure of influence and influenceability introduced in the preceding section are
very demanding computationally. We present here simpler measures that could be used
as proxies for actual computations of equilibrium strategies.
As for influenceability, its simplest expression is as follows.
Definition 1 In the uniform model, the external influenceability of an agent i ∈ N
quantifies how much he will take into account the opinion of an external (i.e., strategic)
agent and is defined by 1/di.
As for influence, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 2 Let W be an arbitrary weight matrix. The opinion variance of an agent
i ∈ N quantifies to what extent his opinion changes and is defined by
Ii =
∫
[0,1]n
(
(Wx)i − xi
)2
dx (50)
where (Wx)i denotes the ith component of Wx.
The absolute value could be taken instead in (50), but this would lead to complicated
computations.
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Proposition 7 The opinion variance of an agent i is given by
Ii =
1
6
(1− wii)
2 −
1
6
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
k>j
wijwkj =
1
12
∑
j 6=i
w2ij +
1
12
(1− wii)
2
Proof: We have
Ii =
∫
[0,1]n
(wi1x1 + · · ·+ (wii − 1)xi + · · ·+ winxn)
2dx. (51)
Let us prove by weak induction on n that for arbitrary weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ R, it holds
for any n ≥ 1: ∫
[0,1]n
( n∑
i=1
wixi
)2
dx =
1
3
n∑
i=1
w2i +
1
2
n∑
i=1
∑
j>i
wiwj (Pn)
Let us check P1. ∫ 1
0
w21x
2
1dx1 =
1
3
w21.
Then P1 is verified, let us suppose Pn true and prove Pn+1. Letting S(n) =
(∑n
i=1wixi
)2
,
we have∫
[0,1]n+1
S(n+ 1)dx1 · · · dxn+1 =
∫ 1
0
(∫
[0,1]n
S(n+ 1)dx1 · · · dxn
)
dxn+1
=
∫ 1
0
∫
[0,1]n
(
S(n) + w2n+1x
2
n+1 + 2
n∑
i=1
wiwn+1xixn+1
)
dx1 · · · dxndxn+1
=
∫ 1
0
(1
3
n∑
i=1
w2i +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
wiwj
)
dxn+1 +
∫
[0,1]n+1
w2n+1x
2
n+1dx+
∫ 1
0
(∫
[0,1]n
2
n∑
i=1
wixidx1 · · · dxn
)
wn+1xn+1dxn+1
=
1
3
n∑
i=1
w2i +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
wiwj +
1
3
w2n+1 +
∫ 1
0
( n∑
i=1
wi
)
wn+1xn+1dxn+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
2
∑n
i=1 wiwn+1
=
1
3
n+1∑
i=1
w2i +
1
2
n+1∑
i=1
n+1∑
j=i+1
wiwj,
the desired result.
Applying this to (51), we get, using the fact that
∑n
j=1wij = 1,
Ii =
1
3
∑
j 6=i
w2ij +
1
3
(wii − 1)
2 +
1
2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
k>j
wijwik +
1
2
∑
j 6=i
(wii − 1)wij︸ ︷︷ ︸
− 1
2
(1−wii)2
=
1
3
∑
j 6=i
w2ij −
1
6
(wii − 1)
2 +
1
2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
k>j
wijwik.
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Now,
(1− wii)
2 =
(∑
j 6=i
wij
)2
=
∑
j 6=i
w2ij + 2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
k>j
wijwik
from which it follows that
Ii =
1
6
(1− wii)
2 −
1
6
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i
k>j
wijwik (52)
or
Ii =
1
12
∑
j 6=i
w2ij +
1
12
(1− wii)
2. (53)

Proposition 8 The opinion variance Ii takes value in [0,
1
6
]. The minimum is achieved
when wii = 1 and the maximum is achieved if and only if wij = 1 for some j 6= i.
Proof: The result for the lower bound is obvious. As for the upper bound, taking (52),
the upper bound is attained iff the first term is maximized and the second is minimized.
Taking wii = 0 maximizes the first term. Now the second term is 0 iff all but one weight
among wij, i 6= j, is nonzero. 
Example 5 In Example 2, the external influenceabilities of the non-strategic agents are
equal to 1 for agent 1, and 1
3
for agents 2 and 3. Their opinion variances are equal to
I1 = 0, I2 = I3 = 1/18. ♦
5.6 The case of a single strategy agent
Before concluding, let us point out that in the case of a single strategic agent, the optimal
targeting problem is trivial in our framework. Suppose indeed that there exists only one
strategic agent a1 who has the extreme opinion equal to 1. As before we can use the
results recapitulated in Section 3 on non-negative matrices and applied in Section 4 to
the model with two strategic agents. If by P we denote the (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix of
weights of the agents in N and a1, then there is one essential class of P , i.e., {a1}, and
all previous classes of W become inessential. The structure of P is therefore
P =
[
1 0
R Q
]
As before, if s1 = i, then the weight wij =
aij
di
becomes 1
di+λ
, and the weight on a1 is equal
to ws1a1 =
λ
ds1+λ
. We have
P =
[
1 0
∆(s1)E(s1)∆(s1)A
]
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with E(s1) = λes1 . If the opinion vector x is written as x = [xa1 xN ]
′, then the opinions
of non-strategic agents are updated as follows:
xN(t+ 1) = R +QxN(t) (54)
and for the uniform model:
xN(t+ 1) = ∆(s1)AxN(t) +
λ
ds1 + λ
es1 (55)
As before, xa1 = 1, convergence of xN always occurs and xN = (I −Q)
−1R. All agents in
N reach consensus equal to 1. Consequently, the payoff of the strategic agent a1 is equal
to πλ(s1) = n, independently of which non-strategic agent i is targeted by a1.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
In the paper we investigate a model of opinion (belief) formation with two kinds of agents
and some strategic aspects of influence. Our point of departure is the model of DeGroot
(1974). Apart from the non-strategic agents that interact as in the DeGroot model, in
our framework there exist additionally two strategic agents with opposite opinions who
target the non-strategic agents in order to influence their opinions. We model the issue
as a zero-sum game played by the two strategic agents. Our results concern convergence
and the characterization of equilibria in the proposed model.
They emphasize two features that are crucial to choose an optimal target in a strategic
setting. On the one hand, the influenceability of the agent measured by (the inverse of)
its number of outgoing arcs, i.e., the number of agents that he listens to. On the other
hand, the influence of the agent for which we introduce a new measure, that can be called
intermediacy and that counts the number of walks that go through a given agent. In the
case where the two strategic agents have the same impact, we show that the relative
importance of intermediacy increases with the actual impact the strategic agents exert
and decreases with the size of the network. In the case where the relative impact of one
of the strategic agents is much greater than this of the other, the high impact agent
should focus on high influence/intermediacy targets and the low impact one on high
influenceability targets.
The framework proposed in the paper (both with two as well as with only one strate-
gic agent) can model naturally many real-life situations of influence, like leadership of
some individuals which influence other members of a group (community, society) while re-
maining not ‘influenceable’ themselves. The non-strategic agents can form, for instance,
the panel of experts/decision makers who must make a decision after discussion. The
strategic agents try to influence the final result at their advantage by targeting one of
the experts/decision makers. Similarly, one might consider an influence by media sources,
targeting consumers in a process of products promotion, influencing voters in political
campaigns, etc. As targeting some individuals is being used rather widely in practice,
it could be interesting to test our model against empirical data from social networks
and with the support of experiments. Which strategies do ‘strategic subjects’ play and
which players do they target in order to influence their opinions? Do their choices of
‘non-strategic subjects’ correspond to our results?
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From a more theoretical point of view, our approach is based on the implicit assump-
tion that the formation of an influence link is a very costly process so that the strategic
agents can only form one link and cannot change it over time. Relaxing both assumptions
would certainly yield new interesting insights.
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